The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

# STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE U.S. ARMY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRAINING FOR WAR AND KEEPING THE PEACE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM G. PHELPS, JR. UNITED STATES ARMY

## **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.

**USAWC CLASS OF 2001** 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20010514 058

#### USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE US ARMY IN THE 21st CENTURY AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN TRAINING FOR WAR AND KEEPING THE PEACE

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM G. PHELPS, JR. Department of the Army

COLONEL Thomas Dempsey
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

> DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

#### **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: LTC William G. Phelps, Jr.

TITLE: The US Army in the 21st Century and the Conflict Between Training for War and

Keeping the Peace

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 12 March 2001 PAGES: 25 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

As the United States Army enters the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, its primary mission remains unchanged – to fight and win our Nation's wars. However, with the exception of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century is replete with examples of the Army's involvement in operations short of "war." Under the rubric of "peace operations" (POs), the US Army participated in operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The purpose of this paper is to address the conflict the Army faces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century between its charter to fight and win our Nation's wars and the ever-increasing requirements to execute peace operations around the world. Some senior leaders argue the skill sets required to fight and win wars and those associated with POs are not exclusive of one another. That assertion is supported in Army Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations. It states:

Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list. However, units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks [emphasis added] that may be different from their wartime METL.

This paper suggests the *significant number of tasks* [emphasized above] required to execute POs are substantial enough for POs to be considered unique and that they should be treated as such. Furthermore, this paper suggests the Army's ability to fight and win our Nation's wars is placed at risk due to the degradation of warfighting skills resulting from executing open-ended POs. The Army is at a crossroads in determining its roles and missions in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It must strike an appropriate balance between the mandate to fight and win our Nation's wars and the ramifications of executing ever-increasing peace operations around the world. Failure to do so places the security of the US at risk.

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

ABSTRACT	
PART I: KEY OPERATING PRINCIPLES	2
PART II: THE COST OF KEEPING THE PEACE	5
PART III: A CALCULATED RISK	13
PART IV: THE ROAD AHEAD	14
SUMMARY	15
ENDNOTES	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

# The US Army in the 21st Century and the Conflict Between Training for War and Keeping the Peace

As the United States Army enters the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, its primary mission remains unchanged – to fight and win our Nation's wars. However, with the exception of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century is replete with examples of the Army's involvement in operations short of "war." Under the rubric of "peace operations" (POs), the US Army participated in operations in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Based on the "open-ended" operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, we can expect such operations to be longer rather than shorter in duration.

The current <u>President's National Security Strategy</u> (NSS)(1999) and the <u>Quadrennial Defense Review</u> (QDR)(1997) support this assertion. The NSS states, "These operations (POs) will likely pose frequent challenges for US military forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time." The QDR states, "Based on recent experience and intelligence projections, the demand for smaller-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years... and may require significant commitments of forces, both active and Reserve."

The purpose of this paper is to address the conflict the Army faces in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century between its charter to fight and win our Nation's wars and the ever-increasing requirements to execute peace operations around the world. Some senior leaders argue the skill sets required to fight and win wars and those associated with POs are not exclusive of one another. That assertion is supported in Army Field Manual 100-23 Peace Operations. It states:

Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list. However, units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant number of tasks [emphasis added] that may be different from their wartime METL.<sup>3</sup>

This paper suggests the *significant number of tasks* [emphasized above] required to execute POs are substantial enough for POs to be considered unique, and that they should be treated as such. Furthermore, this paper suggests the Army's ability to fight and win our Nation's wars is placed at risk due to the degradation of warfighting skills resulting from executing open-ended POs. The Army is at a crossroads in determining its roles and missions in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It must strike an appropriate balance between

the mandate to fight and win our Nation's wars and the ramifications of executing everincreasing peace operations around the world. Failure to do so places the security of the US at risk.

### **PART I: Key Operating Principles**

An examination of the Principles of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) provides a start-point for identifying several of the unique characteristics of POs. <u>Joint Pub 3-07</u>, <u>Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War</u> identifies six MOOTW principles. They are: *Objective, Unity of Effort, Restraint, Security, Perseverance*, and *Legitimacy*. The principles *Objective, Restraint* and *Perseverance* provide excellent examples of the unique characteristics of POs.

#### **OBJECTIVE**

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

Two points of immediate conflict for commanders executing POs are those between political objectives and the influence they have on military operations and tactics. In war, there are usually one or two clearly defined goals (objectives). However, a clearly defined objective containing the purpose, scope, end state, and mandate (if operating as part of a UN force) of conducting a given PO may not always be clear. Objectives change and mandates are often adjusted to meet new requirements. The consequence of "sliding objectives" often present commanders and units executing POs with significant operational challenges. The most dangerous challenge presented is not having the assets in terms of military equipment and personnel to properly execute the expanded objectives. US participation in operations in Somalia offers a case study to illustrate this point.

The US involvement in Somalia proceeded through three stages (each stage inherently different with "add-on" objectives). They were: Operation *Provide Relief*, a humanitarian assistance (HA) mission; Operation *Restore Hope*, an operation that combined HA with limited military action; and UNOSOM II, a peace enforcement (PE) mission involving active combat and nation building.<sup>4</sup> What began as an HA operation under the provisions (UP) of the <u>United Nations (UN) Charter</u>, Chapter VI, evolved into urban combat executed UP of <u>UN Charter</u> Chapter VII. This migration from relatively

benign HA missions to complex urban combat illustrate a phenomenon common to POs called "mission creep."

While mission creep likewise occurs during conventional military operations, the ramifications tend to be more significant during POs than in conventional war. The mission conducted by US forces in Mogadishu Somalia on 3 October 1993 illustrates this point. On 5 June 1993, supporters of clan warlord Mohammed Aideed killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush. Soon afterwards the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 837. It called for the immediate apprehension of those responsible for killing the Pakistani soldiers and "quickly led to US forces being used in a highly personalized manhunt for Aideed." Overnight, soldiers were forced to adjust their mental mindset from a routine of providing humanitarian support and security to what equated to a search and destroy mindset. The military objective, driven by political considerations, changed. The outcome of this expanded mission occurred on 3 October and resulted in a casualty total of 18 Americans killed and 75 wounded. It ultimately resulted in President Clinton ordering the phased withdrawal of American troops ending on 31 March 1994.

The price for maintaining a safe and secure environment in Somalia exceeded both the political and human capital the US was willing to expend. It was clearly irresponsible not to match the mandate of the Somalia "peace operation" with the military wherewithal to carry out *the objective* [emphasis added], as was the case with UNOSOM II. A compelling argument can be made that the metamorphosis of *the objective* behind US involvement in Somalia led to its ultimate failure. The principle of *objective* was violated. The "objectives" quickly shifted from relatively benign HA operations to volatile PE missions. The forces in-place was neither sufficient, nor appropriate to execute later missions, and the objective/s as they evolved were not attainable.

#### RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently

When training warfighting tasks, soldiers are taught they have no more than three seconds to return fire or respond to an act of aggression before they are likely to become casualties. In fact, battle drills are designed to prompt soldiers to respond to potentially life threatening situations with little forethought. The mindset is very simple – kill or be killed. However, during POs soldiers trained to act with aggression and resolve

in war are taught that while they retain the inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent, tactical events (i.e., the unwarranted use of force) may take on strategic significance. Consequently, "peacekeeping requires an adjustment of attitude and approach by the individual (soldier) to a set of circumstances different from those normally present on the field of battle – an adjustment to suit the needs of peaceable intervention rather than of an enforcement action."

Furthermore, the ROE in place during POs are usually more restrictive, detailed, politically sensitive, and subject to more frequent change than wartime ROE. As noted earlier, the excessive use of force could have adverse effects on mission success by undermining the legitimacy of the mission or the perception of partiality. Soldiers taught to react instinctively to dangerous stimuli are now forced to systematically process through a laundry list of conditions to determine if the use of force is warranted. Immediate response in war is replaced by graduated response during POs. Soldiers are therefore required to "unlearn" what would (in war) be a lifesaving mindset.

#### **PERSEVERANCE**

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims

As are the cases in Bosnia and Kosovo, the root causes of conflict between warring factions are often based on religious differences, deep nationalism, or territorial claims over ancestral homes. The deep-seeded differences between antagonists transcend several generations and therefore are unlikely to be resolved overnight. Therefore, "the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, *for as long as necessary* [emphasis added] to achieve them, is often the requirement to success." This begs asking the questions, when is *for as long as necessary* too long, and when does the zeal to persevere reach the point of diminishing returns? Perseverance often translates to prolonged, open-ended POs requiring heavy commitment of money and forces needed elsewhere. Consequently, our zeal to persevere has an impact on force readiness – a topic addressed shortly in this paper.

Arguably, the catalyst for US failure to persevere in Somalia was the death of 18 American soldiers. US failure to persevere in Haiti may be attributed to a government and its institutions being so corrupt and the country's infrastructure so destroyed, that both exceeded the capacity of the US to effect. While Somalia and Haiti demonstrate US failure to persevere, US operations in Egypt (Multinational Force and Observer

[MFO] mission), air operations over Iraq, and ongoing NATO/coalition operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, demonstrate perseverance at the extreme and once again begs revisiting the questions, how long is *for as long as necessary* and when does the zeal to persevere reach the point of diminishing returns? Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to these questions. Given the US Department of State admission that operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are "open-ended," the current answer appears to be – as long as it takes.

"Open-ended" POs come at a cost to the US and its Army. At a time when US military force structure is shrinking, requirements to maintain and keep the peace around the world are on the rise. Sending Army units on repetitive POs increases force-operating tempo and runs the danger of dulling the critical warfighting skills of tactical units. Assessments done within the US Army (principally by the Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL]) have found that individual and collective combat proficiency can drastically deteriorate during the conduct of POs. Recent experiences in Haiti and Bosnia illustrate this problem and will be addressed later in this paper.<sup>8</sup>

## **PART II: The Cost of Keeping the Peace**

In an effort to maintain a balanced approach on the affects POs have on readiness, it is necessary to note that not all units participating in POs suffer degradation in combat readiness. A number of variables determine the extent to which POs affect combat capabilities. These include the type of unit participating, the skills used or not used, the length of participation, and the in-theater training opportunities. In fact, some POs provide excellent experience that can improve the ability of various types of military units to operate in combat scenarios. Transportation, logistics, and to some extent medical units, conduct similar missions to those executed in a conventional scenario. Likewise, special operations forces, particularly civil affairs and psychological operations units, execute operations very similar to those they could expect to do in combat operations.

Without question POs offer opportunities to operate in an environment presenting new challenges on a daily basis. The units most affected in terms of "combat readiness" are combat arms and combat support organizations. Predeployment "warfighting skills" – those associated with executing the critical tasks on the respective unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) quickly atrophy. The critical tasks associated with executing POs, while not all exclusive of those required for warfighting, are nonetheless different

enough in character not to support maintaining proficiency in many, if not most, of the warfighting skills.

The degradation in skills begins as soon as the units alerted to execute a PO commence training (on average about six months prior to deployment depending on the nature of the PO – peacekeeping vice peace enforcement); continues through the duration of the operation (usually six to twelve months), and finally terminates, on average, about six months following redeployment to home station. On a macro-scale, the impact on readiness to the Army is units participating in POs are not combat ready, and certainly not available, for employment into another smaller scale contingency (SSC) or as first to deploy units in a major theater of war (MTW).

Let's examine why units preparing for a PO start the downward spiral away from combat readiness. A light infantry organization alerted to participate in Operation Uphold Democracy, a peacekeeping operation (PKO) in Haiti, will be used to illustrate the readiness arguments presented in this paper.<sup>9</sup>

In very simple terms, combat units training for a PO are not training for war. Granted, depending on the complexion of the PO - peacekeeping vice peace enforcement, the skill sets required vary and often include warfighting skills. However, the operating conditions under which the tasks are performed, and the rules of engagement, will most definitely be different. Infantry and cavalry units in Haiti conducted mounted (presence patrols) and dismounted (saturation) patrols day and night, performed cordon and search, carried out reconnaissance operations, and provided security. These tasks are typically performed during combat operations. However, in Port Au Prince, Haiti the night patrols were conducted under full illumination, as a show of presence, rather than in a stealthier manner, as is the case in war. Further, in the cordon and search operations, before the military entered a building, occupants were given an opportunity to leave peacefully, and searches were conducted with limited inconvenience to the populace. This procedure reduced the level of violence and collateral damage that is likely to occur in war. Finally, reconnaissance patrols and security operations were conducted in full view of the local population as a show of force. Full visibility of US forces provided a credible deterrence to would-be-thugs.

Before further addressing the impact POs have on forces deployed in theater, it is appropriate to discuss the transformation, away from warfighting, that occurs in a unit's train-up to execute a PO. A representative METL and mission statement for a light infantry battalion follows –

- Execute Readiness SOP
- Assault
- Defend
- Fight a Meeting Engagement
- Command and Control the Battalion
- Perform Combat Service Support Operations

#### Mission

On order, TF Infantry deploys worldwide to conduct combat operations as directed

Conspicuously absent from the METL noted above is the task – "Execute Peace Operations." Again, convention supports the belief that units well trained in their warfighting tasks can rapidly transition from a warfighting to a PO focus. However, CALL studies clearly show that "the farther the mission is from warfighting, the more preparation and training is needed. Detailed, mission-specific training is needed to prepare the soldiers for the peacekeeping environment."

The immediate challenge faced by a commander alerted to execute a PO is determining what PO-related tasks should be trained and then developing the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) associated with identified tasks. Army doctrinal manuals and joint publications on POs provide very little to make this challenge less daunting. FM 100-23, Peace Operations dedicates a total of five pages to training. Included in those pages is the comment, "the unique aspects of peace operations should be addressed in predeployment training with the assistance of mobile training teams (MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and if time permits, training at combat training centers (CTCs)."

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War and Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, dedicate a total of two and six pages respectively to education and training for POs. CALL recognized this as a shortfall in its study —

Currently there is no official menu of missions or tasks which a unit can use to train for a peace operation. Training plans are created based on anecdotal experience from other units and locally produced training support training products like the CMTC White Paper. Commanders need a menu of missions from which to choose. They can then quickly build a training plan for their specific contingency operation. Once the missions are identified, they can be cross-walked to the supporting collective and individual tasks.<sup>12</sup>

Based on a study of units that participated in Operations Restore Hope/UNOSOM II in Somalia, the MFO in the Sinai, Operation Able Sentry in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, CALL developed a list of tasks "unique to peace operations", and tasks that "carry over" from wartime tasks, but must be carried out under significantly different conditions.<sup>13</sup> Among the tasks CALL designates as "unique to peace operations" are:

- Use/employ PO ROE
- Separate belligerents
- Apprehend/detain noncombatants
- Enforce cease fire
- Escort a VIP
- Conduct Quick Reaction Force (QRF) operations
- Secure/operate a checkpoint
- Escort a convoy (military and nonmilitary)
- Control/disperse crowd

The tasks noted above are not all inclusive. Myriad other sub-tasks are associated with successfully accomplishing those identified. The intent of identifying these tasks is to support the contention that training for peace is not training for war. You cannot do one while concentrating on the other. It takes time (about six months) to retool organizations trained to fight and win conventional operations to reach a level of proficiency conducive to operating in a PO environment. To someone who has not participated in a PO, the above tasks may seem benign in nature – easy to train. The reality of the matter is soldiers training to execute the noted tasks are systematically having to suppress (unlearn) previously learned tasks associated with warfighting. Soldiers trained to react to contact now have to exercise restraint while applying a new set of ROE. "Negotiation" takes on new meaning. Soldiers rarely find themselves negotiating an obstacle; rather they now are involved in the skill of negotiating peaceful coexistence between belligerents.

Given the frequency the US Army finds itself engaged in POs, and the likelihood of future "combat operations" being executed in an urban environment, it makes sense to add "Execute Peace Operations" to unit METLs. If it is critical enough to execute these tasks to standard during POs, they warrant serious consideration for training as part of a unit's training model.

Getting units trained and ready to deploy to a PO has readiness impacts well beyond the unit/s deploying. Historical vignettes show it takes pulling from at least one level higher than the deploying organization to fill deployment requirements. It takes –

- A company-size element to fill a deploying platoon
- A battalion to fill a deploying company
- A brigade to fill a deploying battalion, etc.

In simple terms, it takes three like-size units to get one ready to deploy. On a microscale, the operational ramifications are significant. First, the elements of units "left behind" have to refit and reorganize to function effectively. This is unlikely to occur since deployed force strength counts against the strength of the forces left behind. "Filler" replacements for stay behind units are not authorized. Second, previously cohesive teams are often broken-up to meet the operational needs of the deploying organization. Leaders from one unit are pulled and inserted to compensate for leaders failing to meet deployment requirements (PCS, ETS, EFMP considerations, medical disqualifications, etc.). Ad hoc organization (bad under the best of circumstances) prevails throughout deploying units and staff.

On a macro-scale, the ramifications of PO deployments are even more significant.

Because similar-type units are often rotated to and from the mission area at four to six month intervals, two similar units are "fenced" from combat contingencies at any given time - - one to train for peace duties and prepare for deployment, the other for block leave, post-deployment personnel shuffles, and retraining for combat missions. In general, the commitment of one battalion to peace operations on these terms is a subtraction of three battalions from the Army's combat-ready strength.<sup>14</sup>

Getting ready to "keep the peace" is difficult at best. Maintaining a well honed, combat ready edge, once deployed on a PO, is even more challenging. Typically, forces deployed to POs use different skill sets to execute required missions. Furthermore, many soldiers deployed as "fillers" find themselves operating outside their respective MOSs for the tenure of the deployment. A post-Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found —

In the Haiti peace operation there was no need for artillery, air defense, or anti-tank fires. Military personnel from these specialties who deployed to Haiti and performed staff, security, and other miscellaneous functions found that their technical skills for operating artillery and providing air defense and TOW missile fires were adversely affected. Even light infantry forces that did not have the opportunity to fully employ their skills faced combat skill degradation if they had no opportunity to practice.<sup>15</sup>

Infantry forces operating in Haiti did not have the opportunity to train the majority of tasks associated with their warfighting missions. Very few operations were carried out above the squad level. Live fire exercises were impossible to conduct for several reasons. First, adequate training facilities were non-existent. Second, "fire and maneuver" exercises were both impractical and unacceptable. PK forces were there to keep the peace vice train for war. Toward the middle of the deployment, and after much negotiation, a very small facility (on private property) was leased (at great cost) to conduct small arms (9mm pistols only) and non-lethal munitions training.

Depending on the situation in and around Port Au Prince, a typical day in the life of an infantry squad or cavalry section looked as follows. Operations were conducted around the clock with "surge operations" occurring when dictated by circumstances in the city.

- Intelligence update
- Mission preparation and rehearsals
  - Included designated QRF (platoon-size) rehearsals/prep
- Execute patrols of varying lengths/time
  - Presence patrol (mounted by CAV dismounted by light infantry)
  - Saturation patrol (platoon-size to ease existing/potential friction in a particular sector)
- Patrol debriefing/equipment maintenance/preparation for next mission
- Convoy escorts (by-exception) for NGOs/PVOs
- Security operations (designated personnel) at the Presidential palace
- Convoy security for Haitian President (designated presidential security unit)

Most of the operations noted above required limited combat skills. The "battle focus" of all participants and staff was on maintaining a safe and secure environment, not on warfighting. Soldiers became very adroit at negotiations between neighbors wishing to kill one another and at practicing the art of restraint. On myriad occasions soldiers fully justified (by the ROE) in using just short of deadly force or deadly force showed great discipline and restraint by not doing so. But what proved to be acts of virtue on the streets of Port Au Prince would manifest themselves as potential beacons of peril on live fire ranges following redeployment. As will be discussed later, it took some time for soldiers used to exercising restraint when faced with an adversary to quickly return fire on a live fire range (post deployment).

Without question, the PO in Haiti affected the combat readiness of participating units. More recent experiences in Bosnia have evidenced similar degradation in readiness to execute critical wartime missions. The 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry and 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Divisions(-) following service in Bosnia reported readiness levels of C-4 (not ready for combat) on

their respective Unit Status Reports (USRs). Following these announcements, senior military leaders and the press asked the division commanders how two of the Army's premier "first to fight" divisions could be in such states. In the case of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division, the CG noted many of his units were not ready to deploy and execute their warfighting tasks following re-deployment to Fort Hood. They needed time to retrain warfighting tasks on their METLs. The 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division commander echoed the same training deficiencies, but added he could not disengage his division(-) from Bosnia, re-deploy to Fort Drum, retrain and refit re-deployed units within the time constraints specified in the war plans his division was apportioned against.

The final component of the cost of keeping the peace manifests itself in post deployment requirements. <u>Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations</u> states –

"Warfighting skills can deteriorate significantly during PO(s), particularly during PKO(s)...At the conclusion of the PKO, training is necessary to return the individual to a combat orientation and to return units to a combat-ready status." <sup>16</sup>

Just as deploying units have to "retool" their thinking and training before deployment, post deployment requires relearning critical warfighting skills. Accomplishing this task requires relearning both the physical components of tasks and a significant mental readjustment. One of the immediate challenges leaders face is to redevelop the "warrior mentality" in their soldiers. The first hurdle is retooling the standing rules of engagement. It takes soldiers time to "flush" the notion of having to systematically cycle through when the use of deadly force is warranted. They now have to return to the old mindset of "kill or be killed." The mindset of "I have three seconds to respond before I become a casualty" is the rule of the day vice, "if I respond inappropriately it may have strategic consequences."

Reinstalling the "warrior mentality" is not an easy transition to make as evidenced by several infantry soldiers on a live fire range following their redeployment from Haiti. Two months after redeployment soldiers had completed individual-level training and were well on their way to rebuilding squad and platoon cohesion. Part of that rebuild was putting the pieces together on a team/squad live fire exercise. The scenario was a simple one involving buddy team and fire team maneuver down a lane where opposing force targets presented themselves. On many of the first live runs (preceded by several iterations of blank fire runs); many soldiers hesitated for up to 4-5 seconds before engaging the

targets. When asked why, several said they hesitated because they were still cycling through the ROE (graduated response levels) they were under in Haiti. The last "graduated response" level (under Haiti ROE) was the use of deadly force and they had to be sure the enemy was in fact a threat before they pulled the trigger. Now, deadly force was the first level of response and it took mental retooling to initiate as a reflex action. After several live fire runs all soldiers managed to "flush" the Haiti ROE. This vignette illustrates a point that will be reiterated later. It takes time for units to return to a warfighting footing following redeployment from a PO. This fact is supported in the CALL study.

The survey (completed by NCOs and officers) shows a clear drop in combat readiness following participation in any peace operation. The most negative impact was on units assigned traditional peacekeeping duties. Perceived readiness in combat skills dropped significantly immediately following the PO and did not return to predeployment levels until between four and six months after return.<sup>17</sup>

Personnel turbulence following a PO deployment further exacerbates the challenge of returning to a warfighting footing. Many soldiers PCS and ETS following redeployment. Newly assigned soldiers have to inprocess and assimilate into new organizations. School backlogs have to be cleared. Some senior NCOs have to attend ANCOC and newly promoted and aspiring NCOs have to attend BNCOC and PLDC. When the soldiers selected for PLDC and BNCOC return, they are often inserted into new leadership positions, requiring more time for team building.

The CALL study found that unit leadership turbulence was the personnel area that had the most dramatic impact on a unit's readiness.

The typical battalion will replace 80 percent of its staff within three to four months of return from an OOTW mission. Not only are staff officers changed, but the staff NCOICs rotate, and the soldiers assigned special duty to the staff sections return to their companies. Typically, about three company commanders will change command in those same three months. Company-level leadership will also be impacted by the changeover of XOs and about half the platoon leaders and some first sergeants. Most of the squad leaders will be new, and almost all the individual soldier and team leader assignments will change because of PCS and promotion to E4 and E5. The effect at platoon level seems most pronounced in combat arms units.<sup>18</sup>

Just as it took time and a concerted effort to prepare deploying units to execute a PO, it takes even more time and effort to refit, reorganize and retrain units redeploying from a

PO to carry out their warfighting missions. And while all this is occurring, the US Army remains charged with fighting and winning our Nation's wars. But what is the real impact of units involved in the PO cycle on overall readiness to execute the war fight? The final part of this paper addresses that question.

#### **PART III: A Calculated Risk**

As noted earlier in this paper, units participating in a PO are not readily available for commitment to an SSC or an MTW. And, as established in the preceding paragraphs, it takes approximately six months following redeployment to get a unit ready to execute wartime METL tasks. Yet our national security strategy keeps units deployed to POs in the mix of forces apportioned against our Nation's major war plans. It contends units must remain flexible and ready enough to transition quickly from a theater PO to an MTW. The QDR acknowledged that withdrawing forces from SSC operations, reconstituting, retraining, and then deploying to an MTW in accordance with required timelines "may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges." 19 However, with no apparent alternatives identified in the strategy, the QDR simply dismissed those "challenges" by insisting that "the ability to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit in the US military."20 Calling the transition of forces from a smaller contingency operation - - where little or no relevant training is likely - - to an MTW a "challenge" is an understatement of the highest magnitude. At best, this strategy is wishful thinking; at worst, it is creating the conditions for a future high casualty disaster."21 Simply stated, the US takes a calculated risk every time it commits forces to participate in a PO. Through its policy of global engagement, the US (Army) has implicitly accepted the risk of such commitments in its responsive combat power and to overall combat readiness. As long as the Army continues to deploy first-to-fight MTW forces to SSCs, it risks a significant, long-term readiness challenge.

Currently, the Army plans on six months of retraining as a rule of thumb following a six to12-month SSC deployment. Thus, by drawing its contingency forces from the MTW force pool, the Army has instituted an inefficient cycle of unit training, shifting from a focus on warfighting tasks to SSC tasks for a deployment, and back to warfighting tasks after redeployment.<sup>22</sup>

Clearly the Army has a conflict between its charter to fight and win our Nation's wars and its ever-increasing requirements to participate in POs. The challenges presented by this conflict result from a mismatch between mission requirements and the forces available to execute those missions. Perhaps it is time for the Army to relook its roles and missions. If there are not enough forces to execute the mounting non-warfighting missions, perhaps it is prudent to reduce US participation in such operations. Perhaps it is time to change our national strategy as it applies to our ability to fight a two-MTW strategy. If the US remains committed to a policy of global engagement, perhaps it is time to renovate the Army's force structure to such an extent it has the forces necessary to carry out its expanding charter. What is clear is our current structure does not support our national strategy.

#### **PART IV: The Road Ahead**

As noted earlier, the NCA's decision to commit US forces to a PO is a difficult one. What often drives the decision is the answer to the question, if not us, who? The United States is the only nation in the world possessing the capabilities to plan, execute and logistically sustain complex POs. What other countries possess in these areas they fall short in terms of world class leadership. Bosnia and Kosovo are classic examples where the United States had a moral obligation to step-up and provide leadership as the sole world superpower. However, some argue that more must be at stake than the requirement for moral leadership. Senator John McCain, among others, suggests the US should not commit to POs unless it is in its vital interests.

"American troops should not be ordered into a conflict unless U.S. vital interests are threatened. This is the primary distinction between the role of a great superpower and that of a policeman. . . While we all hope for a world in which justice and law govern the actions of states, it would be self-destructive hubris for the United States to put the lives of its soldiers at risk for the sole purpose of good citizenship in the international community." 23

Assuming the US does not engage in POs unless its vital interests are at stake, the question still remains, if not us, who? One option is to consider the feasibility of regional forces executing POs. The US limiting its involvement in East Timor to minimal logistics support, while the Australian Defense Force carries out the UN mandate, represents an example of the US invoking this option. However, this option may not be feasible under

circumstances more challenging than those existing in East Timor. Therefore, if one accepts the world leadership role the US will have to play in the future, what (internal) options are available to reduce the challenges and dilemmas surrounding commitment to POs?

One of the myriad variables the NCA has to consider when deciding whether or not to commit US forces to POs is the impact those decisions may have on existing treaties and war plans. To offset the impact of "first to fight" units serving in POs, the National Guard (NG) has been called-up to shoulder more responsibility in recent deployments. Bosnia is representative of this construct with NG and active component (AC) forces rotating operational responsibility and burden sharing. Inclusion of NG units in POs has served as a welcome respite to "low density, high demand" AC units such as military police, engineer, and air defense units. Incorporating NG and selective Reserve Component (RC) units into POs are the outgrowth of operational necessity.

A second option, implied earlier in this paper, is to change the current training paradigm by incorporating critical PO tasks on conventional unit METLs. This in no way suggests that the primary focus of training in "warfighting" units should migrate toward the MOOTW spectrum. Rather it suggests our training should support the NSS and National Military Strategy charter for units to be trained and ready to execute missions across the full spectrum of conflict. Just as POs require commanders to have the capability to seamlessly transition from POs to conventional "combat" operations, the same holds true for having the capability (and training) to go the other way – from combat operations to POs. Both scenarios require participants to be trained on critical tasks spanning the spectrum of conflict.

#### Summary

As the US Army enters the 21<sup>st</sup> Century it must recognize the expanded role it is likely to play as globalization increases. If the Army's role in the past decade tells us anything, it is that the Army will likely find itself involved, perhaps entrenched, in Bosnia and Kosovo-like missions in the future. Experts agree it is unlikely the US will face a serious peer competitor within the next 10-15 years. The inherent challenge the Army faces is striking a balance between its ever-increasing involvement in the implied (yet more likely) mission of being ready to execute peace operations and its specified mission of fighting and winning our Nation's wars. The inherent complexity and unique aspects of executing peace operations efficiently mandate a paradigm shift. As the

Army transforms the force to respond quicker and with greater lethality to anticipated 21<sup>st</sup> Century threats, it is appropriate to transform the manner in which we train to accomplish what may be the most important task of all – keeping the peace.

WORD COUNT = 5986

#### **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> The White House, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u>, December 1999, 18.
- <sup>2</sup> United States Department of Defense, <u>Report of the Quadrennial Defense</u> <u>Review</u>, May 1997, 11, hereafter cited as "<u>QDR</u>."
- <sup>3</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, <u>FM 100-23 Peace Operations</u>, December 1994, 86, hereafter cited as "<u>FM-100-23</u>."
- <sup>4</sup> Kenneth Allard, <u>Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned</u>, (Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 13-14.
  - <sup>5</sup> Ibid, 20.
  - <sup>6</sup> lbid. 39.
- <sup>7</sup> United States Department of Defense, <u>Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military</u> Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, II-5.
- <sup>8</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," 13 August 1999; available from <a href="http://call.army.mil/callspc\_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm">http://call.army.mil/callspc\_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2001, hereafter cited as "CALL Study".
- <sup>9</sup> The author served as the operations officer (S3) of the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade, 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault) from June 1995 through June 1996. During his tenure, the brigade(-) deployed to Haiti to serve as the nucleus of the JTF HQs and to provide part of the forces necessary to execute the PKO. The brigade deployed its headquarters element (significantly augmented to bring it up to JTF HQ manning requirements) and two of its rifle companies (C/1-327IN[+] and B/2-237IN[(+]). 1-101(-) relieved the 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR(-) on 29 October 1995. JTF Bastogne (1-101[-]) remained in country through 29 February 1996 and was the last combat element to redeploy out of Haiti. The author served as the Deputy J3 throughout the deployment.

- <sup>13</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Common Peace Operations Tasks," 13 August 1999; available from <a href="http://call.army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/peactask.htm">http://call.army.mil/call/vignettes/haiti/peactask.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2001, 1.
- <sup>14</sup> James H. Baker, "Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations," <u>Parameters</u>, spring 1994; available from <a href="http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/">http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1994/</a> baker.htm; Internet; accessed 19 February 2001, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> CALL Study, 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> <u>FM 100-23</u>, 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>CALL Study, 3.

- <sup>15</sup> United States Government Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability," 1996; available from <a href="http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-96-014.htm">http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-96-014.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 4 March 2001.
- <sup>16</sup> United States Department of Defense, <u>Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, <u>and Procedures for Peace Operations</u>, 12 February 1999, IV-6.
  - <sup>17</sup> CALL Study, Appendix B, 7.
  - <sup>18</sup> Ibid, Appendix A, 2.
  - <sup>19</sup> QDR, 12.
  - <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Mark E. Vinson, "Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness," Summer 2000; available from <a href="http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/vinson.htm">http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/vinson.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 19 February 2001, 2-3.
  - <sup>22</sup> Ibid, 3.
  - <sup>23</sup> William Greider, Fortress America, (New York, Public Affairs, 1998), 144.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Alberts, Dr. David S. and Dr. Richard Hayes. <u>Command Arrangements for Peace</u>
  <u>Operations</u>. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press Publications, 1995.
- Allard, Kenneth. <u>Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned</u>. Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995.
- Baker, James H. "Policy Changes of UN Peace Operations." <u>Parameters</u>, spring 1994; Available from <a href="http://carlisle-www.army.mil.usawc/Parameters/1994/baker.htm;">http://carlisle-www.army.mil.usawc/Parameters/1994/baker.htm</a>; Internet. Accessed 19 February 2001.
- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "The Effects of Peace Operations on Unit Readiness," 13 August 1999. Available from <a href="http://call.army.mil/callspc\_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm">http://call.army.mil/callspc\_sdy/unitrdy/peaceops.htm</a>; Internet. Accessed 12 February 2001.
- Greider, William. Fortress America. New York, Public Affairs, 1998.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. <u>FM 100-23 Peace Operations</u>. December 1994.
- The White House. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. December 1999.
- United States Department of Defense. <u>Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military</u>
  <u>Operations Other Than War.</u> 16 June 1995.
- United States Department of Defense, <u>Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics</u>, <u>Techniques</u>, <u>and</u> Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999.
- United States Department of Defense, National Military Strategy. 1997.
- United States Department of Defense. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. May 1997.
- United States Government Accounting Office, "Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability," 1996. Available from <a href="http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-96-014.htm">http://www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad-96-014.htm</a>; Internet. Accessed 4 March 2001.
- Vinson, Mark E. "Structuring the Army for Full-Spectrum Readiness," Summer 2000; Internet. Available from <a href="http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/vinson.htm">http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/00summer/vinson.htm</a>; Internet. Accessed 19 February 2001.